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TORT LAW: McENROE TRIES A DIFFERENT COURT:
NO INJURY FROM A BIG MAC ATTACK
John McEnroe has had a great deal of success on the tennis court,
and in September of 1985, McEnroe discovered that his center court suc-
cess carried over to a court of law. McEnroe appeared for a set (of cases,
this time), and he still managed to win the one that had the high stakes
on the line. In Schneider v. McEnroe,' ("McEnroe") the court dismissed
a tort suit against McEnroe which alleged six million dollars in damages.
However, in USAA Casualty Insurance Co. v. Schneider,2 ("USAA Casu-
alty") McEnroe lost an indemnity suit against his insurance company.
But due to the first victory, this decision had no real practical
significance.
Both cases arose out of the same tennis match on August 30, 1983,
in a preliminary round of the U.S. Open Championship at Flushing, New
York. McEnroe was playing tennis against Trey Waltke, but Christo-
pher Schneider, a spectator who heckled McEnroe throughout the
match, became McEnroe's verbal opponent.3
LOVE-LOVE
McEnroe was having difficulty against Waltke, which was a surprise
to the majority of spectators present at the stadium. Waltke had taken a
two-sets-to-one lead, and the crowd thought that they were about to wit-
ness a great upset.' Spectator Schneider anticipated a McEnroe upset,
and was loudly cheering for Waltke. His cheering reached McEnroe
loud and clear due to his close proximity to the tennis court.5
After McEnroe double-faulted6 at a critical moment in the fourth
set, Schneider began to cheer very loudly. McEnroe turned toward the
area where Schneider was seated and inquired, "Don't you have anything
better to do than cheer for my opponent all afternoon?" Schneider re-
torted, quite frankly, "No." McEnroe retaliated with an extremely un-
1. No. 25911/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 6, 1985) (cited in 7 ENT. L. REP. 11 (1985)).
2. 620 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
3. McEnroe, 7 ENT. L. REP. at 11.
4. Id. at 12.
5. Id.
6. A tennis term used to describe the failure of a server to get his two attempted serves
into the proper area of the court. See, e.g., JOAN D. JOHNSON & PAUL J. XANTHOS, TENNIS at
49 (1976).
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couth response. 7 -Point McEnroe.
MCENROE 15-LOVE
McEnroe's poor performance continued and so did the verbal vol-
leying. After McEnroe lost another point, Schneider repeated his cheer-
ing for Waltke. McEnroe became aware once more of Schneider's
presence, and he asked Schneider whether he was going to root for
Waltke all day. Schneider reaffirmed his previous response, and again
McEnroe repeated his crude comment.'- Point McEnroe.
MCENROE 30-LOVE
Play continued, but McEnroe was still not performing up to his re-
nowned tennis ability. Waltke won another point, and Schneider again
applauded Waltke's performance. McEnroe turned toward Schneider
and proceeded toward him shouting, "You are sick, you are sick, you are
ill, you are ill. I want to fight you, fight me now, meet me later. I am
going to get you." 9-Point McEnroe.
MCENROE 40-LOVE
McEnroe started back toward the court, but quickly turned around
and headed straight for Schneider again. When he was approximately
three feet from Schneider, McEnroe pivoted to his right and threw his
left arm up in the air, to a ninety-degree angle. While his arm was mov-
ing, some rosin, apparently used by McEnroe to keep his hands dry while
playing, flew from his hand. McEnroe then proceeded back to the tennis
court and defeated his opponent Waltke three sets to two. 0-- Game
McEnroe.
SERVICE SCHNEIDER
Unknown to McEnroe, some rosin particles from his hand had ap-
parently landed on Schneider. Within one week after the tennis match,
Schneider brought suit against McEnroe for "grievous physical and
mental injuries" alleging six million dollars in damages.II Schneider ar-
gued that his case was valid on any of three legal theories: (1) intentional








infliction of emotional distress; (2) assault; or (3) battery.' 2
Judge Becker of the New York Supreme Court heard the case and
quickly decided that Schneider had no cause of action based on inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.13 Judge Becker stated that the de-
fendant's conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded
as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. '
4
Although Judge Becker viewed McEnroe's behavior as childish and un-
necessary, he ruled that such conduct was not actionable."5
The court also decided that Schneider had no cause of action based
on assault. To establish a cause of action for assault, Schneider had to
prove that McEnroe intended to place him "in apprehension of imminent
harmful or offensive contact."' 6 Judge Becker reasoned that, since
Schneider never pleaded or testified that he felt physically unsafe, Schnei-
der had failed to meet his burden for proving an assault. 7
Finally, the court concluded that Schneider failed to establish a
cause of action based on battery. In order to prove a battery, there must
have been an "intentional body contact which was harmful or offensive
in nature."' 8 Although the court believed that the rosin from McEnroe's
hand did land on Schneider, the court held that this contact was not
harmful or offensive because Schneider sustained no injury.' 9
Judge Becker concluded that Schneider's real injury was the result
of being verbally humiliated by McEnroe. However, Judge Becker stated
that "an action [for assault] cannot be premised on threats or mere words
alone."' 2' Furthermore, Judge Becker declared that the court's job was
not to reward people for "doing an excellent job of 'bench jockeying'"
and causing athletes to lose their temper.2' Becker therefore granted
McEnroe's motion to dismiss and entered judgment in McEnroe's
12. Id.
13. Id. at 11.
14. Id. at 12 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) comment d (1965) (cited
with approval in Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217, 402
N.Y.S.2d 991, 993 (1978))).
15. McEnroe, 7 ENT. L. REP. at 12.
16. Id. (citing Masters v. Becker, 22 A.D.2d 118, 119, 254 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (1964)).
17. McEnroe, 7 ENT. L. REP. at 12.
18. Id. (citing Masters, 22 A.D.2d at 120, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 635).
19. McEnroe, 7 ENT. L. REP. at 12.
20. Id. (citing Carroll v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n., 88 A.D.2d 527,
527, 450 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1982); Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 667, 66 N.Y.S. 454, 455
(1900)).
21. McEnroe, 7 ENT. L. REP. at 13.
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favor.22
USAA Casualty, decided five days after McEnroe, was the second
case resulting from the events of the August 30, 1983 tennis match. Af-
ter discovering that Schneider was suing him, McEnroe contacted his
insurance company, USAA Casualty ("USAA"), and requested that
USAA defend and indemnify him.2 3 USAA then brought this action in
the Eastern District Federal Court of New York, for a declaratory judg-
ment that it was not liable to indemnify McEnroe for losses arising from
Schneider's injuries, should Schneider win his tort suit against McEnroe.
The issue was whether McEnroe's homeowner's insurance policy 24 pro-
vided coverage for Schneider's damages. Although Schneider lost his
case, making the impact of the decision in the second case moot,
McEnroe's theory as to why his policy covered him merits discussion.
McEnroe argued that his homeowner's insurance policy covered
him for any damages for which he would be legally liable arising out of
the Schneider incident. 25 One of the policy's exclusions kept the insur-
ance company from being personally liable for any injury "arising out of
business pursuits of any insured." However, the exclusion did not apply
to "activities which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits."26
USAA argued that Schneider's injuries arose out of a business pur-
suit; thus, the policy excluded the injuries from coverage.27 McEnroe
countered that Schneider had interrupted his business pursuit, a tennis
match, with the confrontation; therefore, the confrontation became an
activity "ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits ....
The court reasoned that McEnroe's tennis match was clearly a busi-
ness pursuit, and that if Schneider was in fact injured, his injury was a
22. Id.
23. 620 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
24. The homeowner policy stated:
COVERAGE E PERSONAL LIABILITY
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because
of bodily injury ... to which this coverage applies, [USAA] will:
a. pay up to [its] limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is
legally liable;
SECTION II-EXCLUSIONS
1. Coverage E-Personal Liability... do[es] not apply to bodily injury...
b. arising out of business pursuits of any insured ....
This exclusion does not apply to:
(1) activities which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits ....
Id. at 247-48.
25. Id. at 247.





result of McEnroe's business pursuit.29 The court disagreed that an in-
terruption took place in McEnroe's business pursuit and ruled that the
altercation did not fall under the policy's coverage.3°
McEnroe further argued that his confrontation with Schneider qual-
ified as a "frolic and detour" from his business pursuit. 3' Citing State
Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. National Union Fire Insurance Com-
pany, 32 ("State Farm") McEnroe argued that a "momentary deviation
from... 'business pursuits'. . . should be classified as an activity ordina-
rily incident to non-business pursuits ....
The court, however, distinguished USAA Casualty from State Farm
because of the occupations of the parties and the manner in which the
parties deviated from their occupations. The court reasoned that tennis
players expect the audience to participate in the event and that "a tennis
player plies his trade and gains an audience not only by gracefully exe-
cuting lobs and passing shots, but also by graciously accepting the cheers
of the crowd after a hard fought victory."' 34 Consequently, the court
granted USAA's motion for summary judgment, concluding that any
possible injury to Schneider clearly arose out of McEnroe's business
pursuit.
35
Both McEnroe and USAA Casualty have important implications for
professional athletes. McEnroe concluded that one cannot sue for mere
words alone, or for being humiliated in front of a large crowd. The court
felt that Schneider provoked the altercation with McEnroe and that
Schneider should have foreseen McEnroe's response, which was merely a
release of some steam. More important to the court's conclusion was the
fact that Schneider never found himself in fear of physical danger. a6
However, it seems difficult to interpret McEnroe's remarks as "mere
words." An extremely hostile man, who glares at someone while waving
a tennis racket in his hand, and who screams that he wants to fight,
would put a reasonable person in fear. One might foresee McEnroe
jumping over the railing in order to quiet his heckler for the rest of the
match. In fact, most hockey enthusiasts are well aware of the numerous




32. 87 Il1. App. 2d 15, 230 N.E.2d 513 (1967).
33. USAA, 620 F. Supp. at 248 (citing State Farm, 87 Ill. App. 2d at 19, 230 N.E.2d at
515).
34. USAA, 620 F. Supp. at 249.
35. Id.
36. McEnroe, 7 ENr. L. REP. at 12.
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a spectator. 31 Baseball fans have likewise seen similar events.38 Thus, it
would not be so unusual for someone with a temper like McEnroe's, not
wearing cleats or ice skates, to hop over the railing and silence Schneider.
One must wonder if the fact that the defendant was John McEnroe
had something to do with the court's decision. Although McEnroe has
shown his childish behavior many times on the tennis court, he has never
harmed anyone. Thus, the court may have realized that McEnroe's bark
was worse than his bite. One must ask whether another person accused
of the same offense would receive the same verdict. Or does McEnroe,
like USAA Casualty, put athletes, especially famous ones, on a different
level?
If McEnroe had actually harmed Schneider, the court's decision
might very well have been different. But the court was very clear in its
statement that it would not squander judicial resources by hearing cases
that involve spectators who agitate athletes to the point where they lose
their tempers.39 Judge Becker should have borrowed a basketball clich6:
No harm, no foul.
In USAA Casualty, the court clearly placed athletes on a different
level than other individuals when deciding if a business pursuit exists.
The court held that no time-outs from the business venture would occur
once the athlete begins the competition. The athlete entertains and per-
forms for the crowd, and any time spent interacting with them is all part
of the job.'
For John McEnroe, the importance of McEnroe clearly outweighed
the significance of USAA Casualty. Perhaps McEnroe will be equally im-
portant to other athletes. Athletes will often find themselves in a con-
frontation with a spectator, and words may be exchanged. As long as
athletes stay within McEnroe's acceptable level of conduct, they need not
worry about paying tort damages.
In addition, both cases have great significance for professional ath-
letes, since these decisions place athletes under a different standard than
the average person. The court will tolerate more outrageous behavior by
an athlete toward a private person than the other way around. Also, the
court frowns upon an individual who tries to take advantage of a famous
athlete, who happens to get a little hot under the collar. Yet, for the
37. See, e.g., Reed, Week of Disgrace on the Ice, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 26, 1976, at
22.
38. See, e.g., Fimrite, Take Me Out to the Brawl Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 17,
1974, at 10.
39. McEnroe, 7 ENT. L. REP. at 13.
40. USAA, 620 F. Supp. at 249.
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athlete, the interaction with the audience is all part of the job. If athletes
want to spar with a spectator, they must remember that neither the refe-
ree, nor the judge, will blow the whistle for a time-out.
Thomas A. Scutti

